Putting two complementary EU strategies on sustainable development into perspective
Most Western Member States of the EU have established welfare states that are concerned with the continuous struggle to integrate economic and social policies, and more recently, to better integrate environmental policies into the historically grown socio-economic models (Meadowcroft 2005 (Meadowcroft , 2006 . This is the background against which sustainable development (SD), the widely accepted societal guiding model that aims to avoid trade-offs and maximise synergies between economic, social and environmental issues, found considerable resonance in Europe (Steurer & Martinuzzi 2205; Steurer 2008; Jordan & Lenschow 2008) . Based on a formal acknowledgement of SD in the Treaty of Amsterdam (European Council 1997) , the EU and its Member States addressed the societal guiding model not with one but with two overarching cross-sectoral strategies for almost a decade, and it seems that this 'double-track pursuit of SD' will be continued in the near future. In 2000, the European Council launched the Lisbon Strategy with a clear focus on economic and social policies, and it was superseded by the Europe 2020 strategy in 2010 (European Commission 2010) . About a year later the Gothenburg European Council agreed on a 14-paragraph 'strategy for sustainable development' in its Council Conclusions, and it emphasised that 'it completes the Union's political commitment to economic and social renewal, adds a third, environmental dimension to the Lisbon strategy and establishes a new approach to policy making ' (European Council 2001, 4) . However, since the 14 paragraphs on SD were too brief to be regarded as full-value EU strategy for SD (Steurer & Martinuzzi 2005) , the adding of an environmental dimension to the Lisbon Strategy was imbalanced and ineffective from the outset. Since the political discourse on SD did not fade in the following years, and most EU Member States followed the Gothenburg Council invitation, 'to draw up their own national sustainable development strategies' (European Council 2001, 4 ; see also Steurer & Martinuzzi 2005) , the EU revisited its strategic approach to SD a few years later. Under the Austrian EU presidency, the European Council adopted a comprehensive SD strategy (EU SDS) in June 2006 (European Council 2006b ; see also Kopp 2006) . Its link to the Lisbon Strategy was refined as follows:
The EU SDS forms the overall framework within which the Lisbon strategy, with its renewed focus on growth and jobs, provides the motor of a more dynamic economy. These two strategies recognise that economic, social and environmental objectives can reinforce each other and they should therefore advance together. Both strategies aim at supporting the necessary structural changes which enable the Member States´ economies to cope with the challenges of globalisation by creating a level playing field in which dynamism, innovation and creative entrepreneurship can flourish whilst ensuring social equity and a healthy environment (European Council 2006b, 6) .
As the EU SDS describes in more detail, it obviously complemented the Lisbon Strategy, both aiming at SD although with different emphases:
The SDS is primarily concerned with quality of life, intra-and inter-generational equity and coherence between all policy areas, including external aspects. It recognises the role of economic development in facilitating the transition to a more sustainable society. The Lisbon strategy makes an essential contribution to the overarching objective of sustainable development focusing primarily on actions and measures aimed at increasing competitiveness and economic growth and enhancing job creation (European Council 2006b, 6) .
Although the governance of SD is a complex challenge that goes well beyond the scope of SD strategies (Kenny & Meadowcroft 1999; Steurer 2009 ), the two cross-sectoral strategies introduced above are supposed to play a key role in this respect. Nevertheless, and despite their obvious complementary character, Lisbon and SD strategies were rarely analysed jointly (for exceptions, see Berger & Zwirner 2008; Steurer et al. 2010) . This scholarly shortcoming is addressed here with the following two research questions:
• What were the key similarities and differences in the governance of the Lisbon and the SD strategies at both the EU and the Member State levels and how did the complementary character of the two strategies materialise in everyday governance routines? • What lessons can be learned for the pursuit of sustainable development in the context of the 'Europe 2020' strategy?
The questions are answered based on policy documents and secondary literature, three qualitative country studies on the governance of Lisbon and SD strategies in Austria, Sweden, and the UK (Pirgmaier 2008) , and extensive discussions with public administrators responsible for SD strategies from across Europe.
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The following section 2 shows how the co-existence of the two strategies came into being. It highlights the international background of SD strategies, and it characterises the Lisbon Strategy as a genuinely European response to global pressures. Section 3 briefly summarises the contents and the governance of the two strategy processes with respect to horizontal and vertical governance linkages. Section 4
shows that the Council rhetoric regarding the horizontal complementarity of the two strategies does not Minster Wim Kok. It observed a 'disappointing delivery [which] is due to an overloaded agenda, poor coordination and conflicting priorities', in which it concluded that 'the Lisbon strategy is even more urgent today' and therefore, 'better implementation is needed now to make up for lost time' (Kok 2004, 6 ). Consequently, the reform programme was overhauled and a renewed Lisbon Strategy with a strengthened OMC approach was adopted by the European Council in March 2005. In the five years since then, the Lisbon Strategy gained momentum but failed to meet its (over-ambitious) objectives (see also section 5). 2 The contents and the governance of the renewed Lisbon Strategy and the EU SDS are summarised and compared in more detail in the following section.
Contents and governance characteristics of Lisbon and SD strategies
The renewed Lisbon Strategy defined the direction of the reform process in a set of 24 so-called Commission assessed all the NRPs, gave country-specific recommendations, and reported to the European Spring Council. however, the 'light form of OMC' applied in the EU SDS deteriorated, together with the political salience of the EU strategy itself. This deterioration and the lack of horizontal integration between Lisbon and SD strategies is described in the following section.
How and why Lisbon and SD strategies ran past each other
In its first EU SDS progress report, the European Commission (2007a) The European Commission itself did not follow up on its own turf. Although the only environmental guideline of the Lisbon Strategy ("to encourage the sustainable use of resources and strengthen the synergies between environmental protection and growth") duplicated key challenges that are dealt with in detail in the EU SDS (for an overview of key policy objectives in both strategies, see Annexes 1 and 2), and although both EU strategies were/are coordinated by the Secretariat General, horizontal governance linkages never materialised. While the Secretariat General was a key driver of the Lisbon Strategy, the EU SDS has been rather issue-driven by a few sectoral Directorates General (in particular by DG Environment) before it lost momentum in recent years. 10 The different governance routines and timetables that have been employed in the two strategy processes (see section 3) were certainly not helpful in this respect.
How strong are the horizontal linkages between Lisbon National Reform Programmes (NRPs) and national SD strategies? As several discussions within a network of public administrators responsible for SD strategies 11 and three qualitative country studies on Austria, Sweden and the UK (Pirgmaier 2008) have shown, governance routines in EU Member States only mirrored the disjointed picture at the EU level. In other words, the governance of national Lisbon reform programmes and SD strategies did not match the complementarity rhetoric in Council Conclusions either. In Austria, Sweden and the UK, the responsibility for Lisbon and SD strategies was assumed by different coordinators and inter-ministerial bodies, and the ties between them were rather weak. In Austria and the UK, officials from the Environment Ministry are responsible for the country's SD strategy, and for commenting on the NRP and the annual progress reports (in particular on policies regarding the sustainable use of natural resources and strengthening synergies between environmental protection and economic growth).
Likewise, the administrators who were responsible for the Lisbon Strategy commented on the economic and employment aspects of SD strategy drafts. Although Sweden had established at least stronger personal ties between the Lisbon and the SDS groups, Pirgmaier (2008) concludes, 'All [interviewed] government officials across the three countries agree that both strategic processes co-exist side by side' instead of being intertwined.
Why was the complementarity of Lisbon and SD strategies in Europe rhetorical rather than substantial?
The remainder of this section suggests the asymmetry in political salience, the complex governance structures in both strategies, and the symbolic character of the EU SDS as explanatory factors.
Regarding the asymmetry in political salience, it is to note that, on the one hand, the Lisbon Strategy was a high-profile political strategy concerned with top priority issues such as economic growth, competitiveness, and employment. These issues have dominated the political agenda of the EU long before the launch of the Lisbon Strategy (Steurer 2001) . On the other hand, the environmental and social focus stood in the shadow of the Lisbon Strategy even around the launch of the EU SDS, and its political salience has further deteriorated since then. This deterioration of the EU SDS can be deduced from the following four developments. First, the 'SDS coordinators group', a group of Member State representatives convened by the Secretariat General, met twice in 2007 and never since. Second, while national SD strategies were regarded as promising new governance tools in the first half of the 2000s (Steurer & Martinuzzi 2005) , more recent empirical evidence suggests that most of them fail to life up to their key purpose to better coordinate SD policies horizontally across sectors and vertically across levels of policy making (Steurer & Martinuzzi 2007 , Steurer 2008 . Since the implementation of the EU SDS relies mainly on Member State policies, it can be assumed that the disappointing performance of most national SD strategies also weakens the status of the EU SDS. Third, the EU SDS progress report was SD strategies, SD strategy coordinators were afraid of being overrun by the Lisbon agenda and therefore hoped that the double-track pursuit of sustainable development helped to preserve their limited yet undisputed sphere of influence that was expected to shape the Lisbon agenda from a distance.
12
The fact that the complementarity rhetoric was not matched with respective governance linkages also had to do with the cross-sectoral nature and the complex governance setup of the two EU strategies (see section 3). Based on empirical evidence on national SD strategies in several European countries, we can conclude that implementing a cross-sectoral strategy is an ambitious task in itself that questions the traditional functioning of public administrations (Steurer 2007; Steurer & Martinuzzi 2007) . Since the Lisbon Strategy was a similarly cross-sectoral approach that facilitated a complex European governance regime and that also fell short in meeting its objectives (see Kok 2004 ; European Commission 2010a), keeping it separate from equally complex (but less powerful) SD strategies was not only a question of political prioritisation but also one of 'strategic manageability'.
The third and final explanation for why the Lisbon and SD strategies ran in parallel rather than in close coordination is concerned with the value-added of a symbolic EU SDS (for symbolic policy making, see Newig 2007 , Baker 2007 , Blühdorn 2007 . According to Newig (2007, 280f ), a legislation (or here more appropriate, a policy) is symbolic when it fails to meet its own objectives but is 'suited to release the legislators from political pressure and to enhance their political acceptance'. If a legislation (or a policy) fails in both respects, one can speak of legislation 'for the files' (Newig 2007, 280) . The low (and decreasing) political salience of the EU SDS and the lack of coordination with the more salient Lisbon Strategy given, the EU SDS can be placed somewhere between these two prototypes of policy making.
However, as Steurer (2008) shows elsewhere, there is apparently some (administrative) scope within political symbolism that some SD strategies are able to occupy. 'The fact that politicians do not care much about sustainable development strategies implies not only that key decisions are made frequently without reference to the sustainable development strategy process, but also that administrators can make use of their limited scope' (if they are dedicated to do so), e.g. in initiating small-and medium scale projects and programmes, and in trying to shape the political agenda setting from a distance (Steurer 2008, 106f) . While this 'administrative driving force' can be found in the SD strategies of some Member States and in the development phase of the EU SDS, it is apparently lacking in the Secretariat General, the EU's coordinating body that 'inherited' the implementation of the EU SDS.
Concluding discussion and outlook on 'Europe 2020'
This paper started out by reciting Council rhetoric stressing the complementarity of the Lisbon Strategy and the EU SDS. It then showed that the two strategy processes have different histories and governance arrangements but complementary contents. On the one hand, the Lisbon Strategy has been described as a genuinely European answer to global pressures that focuses mainly on economic growth and employment. On the other hand, the EU SDS has been characterised as a strategy based on international guidance that integrates environmental and other social policies but neglects economic issues. Although policy makers recognised that close horizontal linkages between the two strategy processes were key success factor for a coherent and balanced pursuit of SD across Europe, the present paper has shown that these linkages never materialised, neither at the EU level nor between Lisbon reform programmes and SD strategies at the national level. A key explanation behind this finding is that the SD concept plays an important rhetorical role in Europe but faces limits when it comes to the actual governance and the implementation of respective strategies and policies. On rare occasions, the rather symbolic function of the EU SDS (and national SD strategies) is unmasked not only implicitly in the lack of adequate governance arrangements and policy implementation efforts but also explicitly in policy documents. In 2005, for example, the European Commission was obviously concerned that some policy makers (or evaluators) take the EU SDS objectives on balancing economic, social and environmental interests too far (in particular in applying impact assessments to new regulations), and it warned in an unusual way:
While the existing impact assessment tool provides a solid basis, the Commission believes that the assessment of economic impacts must be strengthened so as to contribute to the objectives of the renewed Lisbon strategy. Deepening the economic pillar of impact assessment does not compromise the importance of "sustainable development" and the integrated approach, which remains the basis of the Commission's approach. Deepening the economic analysis, which also includes competition aspects, should improve the quality of the assessment of the true impact of all proposals (European Commission 2005a, 5) .
In the same year, the European SD rhetoric quoted throughout this paper was unmasked even more openly at the relaunch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005 (one year before the renewed EU SDS was adopted in June 2006). As Giddens summarises, 'The social and environmental aspects of the Lisbon Agenda seemed to some critics to have been put on the back burner. Commission President José Manuel Barroso replied to his detractors by saying: "If one of my children is ill [i.e. the economy], I focus on that one, but that does not mean I love the others less" (Giddens 2006, 166) .
According to Eurostat, the GDP growth rate for the EU-25 was 2% in 2005, 3.1% in 2006, and slightly lower in the Euro zone.
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What can we conclude from the fact that the double-track pursuit of SD in Europe obviously failed to deliver? While policy integration is a politically and administratively difficult (and politically often ignored) but tangible task between two sectors, it seems to become purely symbolic when a strategy becomes too all encompassing, or when two comprehensive cross-sectoral strategies are supposed to Interestingly, the integration of climate policy objectives in the 'Europe 2020' strategy is not owed to the influence of SD strategies, but to the political attention climate issues gained over the last years. As Jordan und Lenschow (2008, 316f) Second, the integration of key environmental issues in the 'Europe 2020' strategy should be complemented not with a similarly cross-sectoral SD strategy but with a more focussed European environmental and climate strategy (merging the Environment Action Programme and the EU's climate policy package adopted by the European Council in 2009). As Jordan and Lenschow conclude, "rather than being interpreted as the overarching concept, sustainable development seems to be seen as 'easier', less challenging when compared to EPI. In times of retreat from environmental policy integration, rhetoric tends to shift to sustainable development as a presumably more even-handed concept.
[…] Politically speaking […] sustainable development is more frequently read as prioritizing economic development while 'taking into account' environmental objectives and searching for synergetic effects" (Jordan & Lenschow 2008, 338) . The evidence presented here and the conclusion drawn from it suggest that the contribution of the even-handed notion of sustainable development to environmental policy making should at least be questioned critically, in particular in the context of the EU's Lisbon and 'Europe 2020' strategies. While the balanced understanding of SD has obviously great difficulties in better integrating economic, social and environmental policies, a more focused EU environmental and climate strategy may be able to complement the economic and social focus of the 'Europe 2020' strategy more effectively.
Since the option of returning to more focused environmental strategies stands not only against the still predominant governance zeitgeist associated with the sustainable development concept, but also against the logic that administrators working on SD strategies do not question their own competencies, the latter explore a third option. Those responsible for SD strategies wonder how to attain a politically more salient future for their own turf. 15 However, based on what this paper and other research (Steurer & Martinuzzi 2007 , Steurer 2008 ) has brought to light, SD strategies are doomed to failure if they hold on to their original purpose of coordinating and integrating all kinds of economic, social, and environmental policies. What SD strategies can (and should) realistically achieve is (i) providing guidance on how societal development should look like in the near and far future, (ii) translating this general vision into operational priorities, and, (iii), communicating both vision and priorities throughout the political system, to businesses (as a quest for more voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility/CSR), and to society at large (for a similar understanding of SD strategies as communication instrument, see Jacob et al. 2008 ). Compared to the ambitious purpose of SD strategies as described in numerous guidelines (Steurer & Martinuzzi 2005) , this option seems to be a retreat in the governance of SD.
Taking into account political realities and the role awareness plays in understanding and realising winwin solutions, recalibrating SD strategies to what they can realistically achieve may prove to be adequate progress after all. 15 This topic was discussed at the ESDN Conference in Prague in June 2009. For a documentation of a telephone survey and the working group discussions, see http://www.sd-network.eu/?k=ESDN%20conferences&s=home&year=2009.
